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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case involves the alleged right of grandparents to 
challenge the adoptive placement of an infant born out of wedlock. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the paternal grandparents of an illegitimate 
infant have custody rights in relation to the infant where the 
father died without establishing parental rights and the mother 
placed the infant for adoption at birth. 
Standard of review: Correction of error. Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the grandparents of an infant who was placed for 
adoption at birth have a right to visitation with the infant 
following the adoption. 
Standard of review: Correction of error. Id. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
This case is governed by U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4 and 30-5-2, which 
are set out verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 11-12.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the grandparents of an illegitimate 
infant seeking to establish custody and visitation rights in 
relation to the -infant. The infant's father died prior to the 
infant's birth. The only defendant is the infant's mother, who 
placed the infant for adoption at birth. (Complaint, R. 1.) The 
mother moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs have no 
legal rights in relation to the infant. (R. 6-16.) The district 
court, treating the motion as one for summary judgment, granted the 
motion and dismissed the Complaint. (R. 92, 100, 102-07, Add. 1-
9.) Plaintiffs filed this appeal. (R. 109.) 
STATEMENT OF FACT8 
Defendant, Jennifer Nordfelt, who has never been married, 
became pregnant at the age of sixteen while she was living with her 
family in Germany. The father was David V. Kasper, son of the 
plaintiffs. Jennifer and David discussed the options of marriage 
and adoption. During the pregnancy, Jennifer moved to Utah to 
complete high school and to decide whether to marry David, to rear 
the child alone, or to place the child for adoption, David was to 
visit Jennifer in June 1989, when they would decide on a course of 
action. In the meantime, wedding announcements were printed but 
not mailed. On June 17, 1989, before he could visit Jennifer, 
David was killed in an automobile accident in Germany. (Nordfelt 
Aff't, If 2-5, R. 70-71; Findings of Fact, Add. 5-6.) 
Jennifer subsequently counseled with LDS Social Services, a 
licensed adoption agency, regarding placement of her expected baby 
for adoption. Jennifer wanted to do what was best for the baby and 
decided it was in the child's best interest to place it for 
adoption in a two-parent home. Jennifer informed the plaintiffs 
on several occasions that she intended to place the baby for 
adoption, and plaintiffs agreed that it was her decision. 
Jennifer's baby was born September 26, 1989. On the next day, 
Jennifer signed an Affidavit and Release relinquishing custody and 
control of the baby to LDS Social Services for the purpose of 
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placing the baby for adoption. LDS Socia l Services v e r i f i e d that 
no one had reg i s t ered an acknowledgment of paterni ty with the s t a t e 
and immediately thereaf ter placed the baby with adoptive parents , 
with whom the ch i ld has s ince res ided . (Nordfelt A f f ' t , M l , 6-
13, R. 70-73; Edwards A f f ' t , R. 19-21; Findings of Fact, Add. 5-
6.) 
On September 26, 1989, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a "Complaint for 
Grandparent V i s i t a t i o n Rights ." (R. 1.) The Complaint a l l e g e s 
that p l a i n t i f f s are the grandparents of the c h i l d born t o Jennifer , 
that Jennifer intends t o place the ch i ld for adoption, and that 
" p l a i n t i f f s wish t o e i t h e r adopt sa id c h i l d , or t o exerc i s e t h e i r 
grandparent r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n . " (R. 2 . ) Jennifer moved to 
dismiss on the grounds that p l a i n t i f f s have no custody or 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s in r e l a t i o n t o her c h i l d , and case law 
recognizing grandparent r i g h t s where a c h i l d i s "parentless" does 
not apply. (R. 8-16, 55-62, 81-90.) The d i s t r i c t court , a f ter 
considerat ion of the p a r t i e s ' memoranda, a f f i d a v i t s , and oral 
arguments, granted summary judgment for Jennifer and dismissed the 
Complaint. (Add. 8-9 . ) * 
In the i n t e r e s t of expedit ing t h i s proceeding and avoiding unnecessary 
delay of the adoption, defendant chose not t o r a i s e the i s sue of whether 
p l a i n t i f f had f a i l e d t o jo in indispensable par t i e s under Utah R. Civ. P. 19. 
Since the ch i ld in which p l a i n t i f f s seek custody and v i s i t a t i o n r ights has been 
placed for adoption, i t would appear that the adoption agency, the adoptive 
parents, and the ch i ld have an i n t e r e s t in the outcome, and that they would be 
prejudiced by a rul ing for the p l a i n t i f f s . See, e.g.. S e f t e l v. Capital Citv 
Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944-45 (Utah App. 1989). However, because p l a i n t i f f s ' claims 
have no bas i s in the law, as the d i s t r i c t court concluded, the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a judgment pre judic ia l t o absent par t i e s i s remote. Accordingly, the i s sue of 
t h e i r joinder t o t h i s act ion need not be addressed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Adoption rights are purely statutory. Utahfs adoption statute 
does not give grandparents a right of consent to the adoption of 
their grandchildren. Moreover, case law uniformly holds that 
grandparents have no right to override the adoption decision of a 
parent or to contest the award of custody to adoptive parents. 
Plaintiffs have no right to a custody hearing based on the 
"parentless" exception to the foregoing rules because defendant's 
child was never parentless. Inchoate grandparent rights come into 
play only if all parental rights are terminated and no longer 
control. Defendant's relinquishment of her child for adoption did 
not effect a legal termination of her parental rights. By statute, 
those rights are merely transferred to the adoption agency, subject 
to reinstatement, pending the final adoption decree. Only that 
decree terminates the natural parent's rights, while simultaneously 
vesting those rights in the adoptive parents. At no time during 
the process is the adopted child parentless. 
Grandparent visitation rights are purely statutory. The Utah 
grandparent visitation statute, construed in accordance with 
similar statutes from other jurisdictions, does not apply where the 
rights of natural parents are terminated and grandchildren are 
adopted by nonrelatives. To allow grandparent visitation in this 
context would defeat the traditional confidentiality of the 
adoption and encroach upon the right of the adoptive parents to 
forge a new family unit free from interference by former relatives. 
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ARGUMENT 
The essence of plaintiffs1 argument on appeal is that they are 
entitled to some custody or visitation right in relation to 
defendant's child merely by virtue of their biological connection 
as grandparents. They cite no statutory authority for either right 
in their brief. Plaintiffs argue that they have an interest in the 
welfare or custody of the child entitling them to a hearing on 
their fitness as adoptive parents or, alternatively, to visitation 
rights following adoption by the proposed adoptive parents. (Br. 
of App. at 4.) Plaintiffs rest both custody and visitation claims 
on the notion that defendant's child is "parentless," thereby 
giving rise to protected grandparent rights. (Id. at 4-9.) 
Neither claim has merit. 
While this is not an "adoption proceeding," as plaintiffs 
claim (Br. of App. at 9) , the same principles apply because 
plaintiffs seek to block the proposed adoption and to assert their 
own adoption rights. Adoption was unknown at common law; 
accordingly, adoption proceedings and all legal rights and 
consequences thereunder are purely statutory. Moreover, adoption 
statutes are strictly construed, precluding assertion of equitable 
or implied rights. Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 268 
P.2d 995, 997 (1954); In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983); 
In re Anonymous, 47 Misc. 2d 139, 261 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (1965); In 
re Adoption of Watson, 361 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Haw. 1961). Parents 
are uniformly held to possess the paramount authority over the 
custody and visitation of their children. That authority extends 
5 
t o re l inquish ing a ch i ld for adoption or forbidding v i s i t a t i o n by 
certa in people , including grandparents. In re Peter L . . 59 N.Y.2d 
513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 482-83 (1983); L.F.M. v . Department of Social 
Serv ices . 67 Md. App. 379, 507 A.2d 1151 f 1154 (1986); In re 
Nicholas, supra, 457 A.2d at 1360. Accordingly, as the fol lowing 
d iscuss ion demonstrates, defendant has f u l l authori ty t o re l inquish 
her c h i l d for adoption, without the consent of the c h i l d ' s 
grandparents; and the adoptive parents , acquiring f u l l parental 
r i gh t s through j u d i c i a l decree, have the r igh t t o maintain the 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of the adoption by refus ing t o al low v i s i t a t i o n by 
former b i o l o g i c a l grandparents. 2 
There i s some confusion in the record on exact ly what r e l i e f p l a i n t i f f s 
seek and on what l ega l theory or theor ies they r e l y . The t i t l e and prayer for 
r e l i e f in the Complaint mention only v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , based on U.C.A. 30-5-
2. Yet, the body mentions a des ire for adoption, without suggesting any lega l 
bas is for adoption. (R. 1-2.) P l a i n t i f f s argued in the d i s t r i c t court only that 
they should have custody because the chi ld i s "parentless ." They dropped the 
v i s i t a t i o n argument based on 30-5-2 . (R. 36, 95 . ) The d i s t r i c t cour t ' s Ruling 
lumps the custody and v i s i t a t i o n arguments together and denies them both on the 
grounds that the ch i ld i s not "parentless ." (R. 92-94. ) P l a i n t i f f s fol low that 
same pattern on appeal, arguing for both custody and v i s i t a t i o n on the grounds 
that the ch i ld i s "parentless ." However, the "parentless" argument i s actual ly 
relevant only t o the custody claim because (1) the case authority for the 
"parentless" argument dea l t only with custody; (2) custody and v i s i t a t i o n are 
based on e n t i r e l y d i f f erent l ega l considerat ions; and (3) i f p l a i n t i f f s prevai l 
on the "parentless" argument, v i s i t a t i o n i s immaterial, while i f p l a i n t i f f s lose 
on that argument, they would have t o base t h e i r claim t o v i s i t a t i o n on some other 
legal theory, presumably U.C.A. § 30-5-2 . In view of t h i s confusion, in a good 
fa i th e f f o r t t o address f u l l y both of p l a i n t i f f s ' c laims, defendant w i l l d iscuss 
p l a i n t i f f s ' "parentless" argument in connection with the custody claim and 
address p l a i n t i f f s ' v i s i t a t i o n argument separately under 30-5 -2 . 
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POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE 
NO CUSTODY RIGHTS IN RELATION TO DEFENDANT'S CHILD AND 
THAT THE ASSERTED "PARENTLESS" EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY. 
A. Plaintiffs Have No Custody Right 
Utah's statutory adoption scheme, like that of other states, 
provides for adoption by the consent of the parents alone. Section 
78-30-4(1), U.C.A., states in relevant part: 
A child cannot be adopted without the consent of 
each living parent having rights in relation to said 
child . . . . [Add. 11.] 
The statute nowhere mentions a right of consent in grandparents or 
other relatives. Even a child born to a minor parent may be 
relinquished with the consent of the parent alone, despite 
objection from grandparents. Subsection (2). Moreover, plaintiffs 
cannot claim a derivative right of consent through their son 
because subsection (1) expressly limits the right to "each living 
parent," and their son was not living at the time of the 
relinquishment. Even if plaintiffs' son had married defendant, 
thereby acquiring full paternal rights, those rights still would 
have ended upon his death. As it turned out, plaintiffs' son 
acquired no paternal rights prior to his death because subsection 
(3) denies a right of consent to unwed fathers who fail to register 
their paternity prior to the relinquishment. The biological 
connection alone is insufficient to establish a right of consent 
to adoption. See, e.g.. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services. 795 P.2d 
637 (Utah 1990). It makes no difference that the unwed parents 
discussed marriage or that the father came close to timely 
registration of paternity. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 
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680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 
199 (Utah 1984). It would be anomalous indeed if paternal 
grandparents could claim a right of consent to adoption when no 
such right is recogni2*ed in their son, the biological father. 
While there is no Utah case directly on point, cases from 
other jurisdictions uniformly hold that grandparents have no 
custody or consent right in a child voluntarily relinquished for 
adoption by a parent. For example, in In re Peter L. , 59 N.Y.2d 
513, 453 N.E.2d 480 (1983), a mother relinquished her child for 
adoption following the death of the child1s father. The paternal 
grandmother, with whom the child had lived for a brief time, 
opposed the adoption, claiming that she had a liberty interest in 
the child giving her a custody right superior to that of 
prospective adoptive parents. The court held that the mother's 
right of consent precluded the grandmother's challenge: 
[There is no] statutory or judicial precedent in 
this jurisdiction offered for the proposition that a fit 
member of an extended family takes precedence over 
adoptive parents selected by an agency to which has been 
transferred the natural parent's power to consent to an 
adoption. The recognition of any such right would of 
course materially undermine the decision voluntetrily made 
by the parent in determining to confer on the agency the 
power to act in her place in granting or withholding 
consent to adoption. Moreover, the complexity which 
would be added to the process of adoption of a child 
surrendered to an agency if all such fit members of the 
child's extended family were to be recognized as 
possessing a prior claim to a child, the relinquishment 
of which would have to be obtained before a secure 
placement for adoption could be made, itself argues 
forcefully against the recognition of the claim now 
urged. [Id., 453 N.E.2d at 482.] 
The court concluded that while grandparents may have limited 
statutory rights with respect to their grandchildren, "those rights 
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do not entitle a grandparent to override the right of the natural 
parent to surrender the child to a public agency and to confer on 
it the right to consent to the adoption of the child." id. at 483. 
Such reasoning is even more compelling in cases, like the 
present, involving newborn placements, where the objecting 
grandparent has developed no significant relationship with the 
child. For example, in Christian Placement Service v. Gordon. 102 
N.M. 465, 697 P.2d 148 (App. 1985), an unwed mother stationed at 
an Air Force base relinquished her newborn child for adoption. The 
unwed father subsequently died, and the paternal grandmother sought 
to intervene in the adoption proceeding to assert custody and 
visitation rights. The court held that she could not intervene 
because a grandparent has no natural or inherent right to custody 
as against third parties who are seeking to adopt with the consent 
of the parent. Jd., 697 P.2d at 152, 155. See also In re Adoption 
of G.D.L.. 747 P.2d 282, 285 (Okla. 1987) (grandmother has no 
"interest" to justify intervention in adoption proceeding where 
both unwed parents consented to adoption). 
Other cases also recognize that grandparents have no legal 
standing to challenge the adoption of a grandchild placed with the 
consent of a parent. In Brant v. Bazemore. 173 Ga. App. 294, 325 
S.E.2d 905 (1985), a minor child's father was deceased and the 
mother placed the child for adoption. The court held that the 
paternal grandparents lacked standing to object to the adoption. 
On similar facts, In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983), held 
that a paternal grandfather had no standing to challenge the 
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adoption of his out-of-wedlock grandchild. The court observed, 
"The persons who determine whether a child will be adopted or not 
are his parents." Id. at 1360. See also Lockev v. Bennett, 244 
Ga. 339, 260 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1979)("[R]elatives of a child may not 
file objections to its adoption as long as one natural parent is 
living and has consented."); Graham v. Children's Services 
Division, 39 Or. App. 27, 591 P.2d 375, 379 (1979) (grandparents 
have no liberty interest giving them rights superior to a 
nonrelative proposing to adopt with the consent of a parent). 
Based on the language of 78-30-4 and the foregoing case 
authorities, it is evident that plaintiffs have no right to 
override Jennifer's decision to place her child for adoption and 
to thereby obtain custody for themselves. 
B. The "Parentless" Exception Does Not Apply 
Defendant has discovered no case recognizing a custody or 
consent right in grandparents of a child voluntarily relinquished 
for adoption by a parent. Plaintiffs rely on Wilson v. Family 
Services Division. 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976) (Br. of App. at 4-5), 
but Wilson and its progeny all dealt with children who were legally 
"parentless." 
In Wilson, a mother was charged in Juvenile Court with neglect 
and abuse of her child; she agreed to judicial termination of her 
parental rights; and the court ordered Family Services to place her 
child for adoption. The grandmother sued to block the adoptive 
placement, seeking to adopt the child herself. The Utah Supreme 
Court acknowledged that "the only persons having any actually 
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vested interest in the custody of a child cognizable by the law are 
the parents"; that "they are the only ones who have a right to 
notice and a hearing in court proceedings to determine custody"; 
and that "[i]f the law recognized any right of custody beyond the 
parents, the number of potential protestants, such as grandparents 
. . ., would create a situation so fraught with possibilities for 
trouble as to make the placement of children difficult if not 
entirely impractical, a result which we agree should be avoided." 
Id. at 229. However, the court recognized an exception to these 
rules where the child is "parentless": 
[N]ext of kin, such as this grandmother, do have some 
dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and 
welfare of children who become parentless, so that they 
may come forward and assert their claim. [Id. at 231.] 
The court concluded that while the grandmother's interest "does not 
rise to the dignity of an absolute legal right," it is sufficient 
to entitle her to a hearing on the merits of her petition. Id. 
Thus, under the narrow Wilson exception to the general rule, 
when a child is "parentless," due to either death or judicial 
termination of parental rights, and parental prerogative therefore 
no longer controls, a grandparent has a right to be heard 
concerning the custody and welfare of a grandchild. This interplay 
between the rights of parents and grandparents is well summarized 
in Muaaenbora v. Kessler, 630 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Okla. 1981): 
When both parents are either dead or their parental 
rights have been severed, a grandparent . . . has 
standing to claim custody of his offspring. While either 
natural parent is alive and his parental bond remains 
judicially unsevered, a grandparent cannot be regarded 
as an affected or interested party with a right to notice 
in an adoption proceeding. This is so because the 
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court's authority to entertain the adoption petition is 
conferred by the consent of the natural parents . . . , 
whose will . . . may not be ordinarily defeated by the 
opposition from a grandparent who is without some 
judicially recognized claim. 
Cases following Wilson all turned on the fact that the 
children were "parentless." In State in Interest of Tom, 556 P.2d 
213 (Utah 1976), where both natural parents died, the court stated: 
"[W]hen children become parentless, the next of kin have a 
recognizable and legitimate interest in them which should be given 
due consideration by the court.11 See also State in Interest of 
Summers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1977) (mother died and 
father's parental rights were judicially terminated); K.O. v. 
Denison, 748 P.2d 588 (Utah App. 1988)(parental rights judicially 
terminated and grandmother cared for child since birth). 
The "parentless" exception plainly does not apply to the 
present case because Jennifer's child has nejver been parentless. 
Jennifer has not died and her parental rights have not yet been 
judicially terminated. Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs' argument 
(Br. of App. at 7-8), Jennifer's release of custody of her baby to 
a licensed adoption agency does not legally terminate her parental 
rights. 
Section 78-30-4(1), cited by plaintiffs, authorizes a parent 
to transfer custody and parental rights to an adoption agency for 
the purpose of future adoption. Jennifer did so in this case. 
(R. 22.) However, until the adoption is finalized, the release 
remains subject to revocation by the parent or rescission by the 
agency. For example, if a mother changes her mind before her child 
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has been placed with adoptive parents, or if the agency cannot find 
a suitable placement, or if the child has special needs that the 
prospective adoptive parents cannot handle, the agency may return 
the child to the mother without judicial proceedings to reinstate 
her parental rights. If plaintiffs were correct, the mother in 
such a case would have to file adoption proceedings to regain her 
parental rights. Such a notion is contrary to the statutory 
scheme, and to section 78-30-11 in particular, which states that 
the natural parents are relieved of all parental rights and duties 
"from the time of the adoption." "Adoption" is defined as "the 
judicial act which creates the relationship of parent and child 
where it did not previously exist, and which permanently deprives 
a birth parent of his parental rights." Section 78-30-16(1)(b). 
Accordingly, Jennifer's parental rights will not be legally 
terminated until entry of the final adoption decree when those 
rights are simultaneously vested in the adoptive parents. See §§ 
78-30-9 and -10. At no time during the adoption process will 
Jennifer's child be parentless. See Davis v. Davis. 708 P.2d 1102, 
1112 (Okla. 1985)(through voluntary adoption "[t]he replacement of 
the lost parent is effected in the very same proceeding that 
produces the severance of the old parental bond"). 
In summary, the Wilson "parentless" exception does not apply 
in this case because Jennifer's parental rights have not been 
judicially terminated. Accordingly, plaintiffs have no equitable 
right to custody. 
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POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE 
NO VISITATION RIGHT FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF 
DEFENDANTS CHILD BY THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS. 
As indicated above, grandparents have no common law right to 
visit or communicate with their grandchildren. Grandparent 
visitation may occur only by parental consent or by judicial decree 
based on statutory authority. See, e.g.. L.F.M. v. Department of 
Social Services. 67 Md. App. 379, 507 A.2d 1151, 1154 (1986). In 
Utah, section 30-5-2 authorizes a district court to "grant 
grandparents reasonable rights of visitation to grandchildren, if 
it is in the best interest of the grandchildren." (Add. 12.) 
While there is no Utah case construing the statute, cases from 
other jurisdictions with similar statutes uniformly hold that such 
provisions have no application where the rights of natural parents 
are terminated and the grandchildren are adopted by nonrelatives. 
For example, in L.F.M. v. Department of Social Services. 
supra. a court terminated the rights of both parents to their two 
children for abuse and neglect and ordered the children placed for 
adoption. The grandparents, who had an established relationship 
with the children, filed a petition seeking visitation rights based 
on a grandparent visitation statute. The court noted that such 
statutes are generally intcmded to allow continued grandparent 
visitation following the death or divorce of a parent, not to alter 
the traditional confidential nature of an adoption by nonrelatives. 
Id.. 507 A.2d at 1156-57. The court, accordingly, denied the 
visitation claim: 
A close examination of the cases we have found which have 
held that grandparental visitation may be permissible in 
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the context of adoption, reveals that they are closely 
tied to state statutory grants of grandparental 
visitation. Furthermore, the cases we have reviewed all 
involved a disruption of family relationships caused by 
divorce or the death of a natural parent and subsequent 
adoption by step-parents or relatives. 
To-date, forty nine states have enacted statutes 
which grant visitation rights to grandparents in certain 
circumstances. . . . Of those states that expressly 
authorize grandparental visitation in the context of 
adoption, the statutory grants of visitation are 
inapplicable in the case of non-stepparent adoption. We 
have found no state statute which authorizes a petition 
for grandparental visitation following the termination 
of natural parental rights and an adoption by strangers. 
[Id. at 1159-60.] 
Allowing visitation by former grandparents would also be 
contrary to the primary purpose of adoption statutes to end prior 
relationships and to create a new parent-child relationship 
entitled to all the rights and privileges of a natural one. See 
U.C.A. §§ 78-30-9 and -10. As stated in Browning v. Tarwater, 215 
Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1974), also denying a claim of 
grandparent visitation rights: 
Public policy demands that an adoption carry with 
it a complete breaking of old ties. Under the new 
relation thus created, the adoptive parents are as much 
entitled to the custody of their adopted child as natural 
parents are to their natural children. The rights of the 
adoptive parents are of the same nature and scope as 
those of a natural parent, subject to the same 
restrictions as those of natural parents. Where the 
adoption statute, as here, gives the adopted child the 
status of a natural child and frees the natural parents 
of legal obligations toward it, a court in granting an 
adoption decree is without authority to include in the 
adoption decree a grant of visitation privileges to the 
natural parent or members of the natural parents' family. 
The Browning court thus concluded that the grandparent visitation 
statute must be construed "subject to the adoption laws." id. at 
1140. 
15 
Other courts have also refused to allow grandparent visitation 
following adoption. In Faust v. Messincrer, 497 A.2d 1351 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985), the court held that statutory grandparent 
visitation rights end upon adoption of the grandchild: 
Rights of inheritance are changed; parental and 
filial rights and duties are altered; birth records are 
substituted; adoption records are impounded. In every 
possible respect, all family relationships are thus 
reestablished within the adopting family and all ties 
with the natural family are eradicated. . . . It is our 
opinion that adoptive or natural parents should have the 
right to select the persons with whom their child will 
associate as long as they properly perform their duties 
to the child. To take this right away from proper 
parents would not be for the best interest of the child. 
[Id., 497 A.2d at 1353-54.] 
See also In re Adoption of Schumacher, 120 111. App. 3d 50, 458 
N.E.2d 94, 97-98 (1983)("the majority view is that an adoption 
terminates a grandparent's visitation rights despite the existence 
of such statutory provisions authorizing grandparent visitation"); 
Aeoerter v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. App. 1980)("the 
adoptive parents should be able to determine the direction of the 
adopted child's life" without interference from former 
grandparents); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985, 987 (Okla. 1977)(adoptive 
parents cannot be compelled to allow visitation by grandparents); 
Christian Placement Service v. Gordon, supra. 697 P.2d at 153 
("statutory visitation rights do not apply in adoption proceedings 
after the termination of the natural parents' rights"). 
In summary, section 30-5-2 cannot be construed to allow 
plaintiffs visitation rights with Jennifer's child following the 
child's adoption by the adoptive parents. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district 
court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. 
DATED this //~^day of January, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
David M. McConkie 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
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an affidavit and release relinquishing her child to LDS 
Social Services, a licensed child placement agency, for 
adoptive placement; that said agency has placed such child in 
an adoptive home. 
(c) That David V. Kasper was the father of 
said child; that David V. Kasper was killed in an automobile 
accident on June 17, 1989. 
(d) That defendant and David V. Kasper were 
not married but planned to marry on or about July 22, 1989. 
(e) That the plaintiffs are the parents of 
David V. Kasper, deceased. 
(f) That plaintiffs wish to adopt said child 
or at least to exercise grandparent rights of visitation 
under the provisions of Section 30-5-2 UCA. 
(g) Defendant insists that said adoptive 
placement through the LDS Social Services be confidential 
and anonymous. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes as 
follows: 
1. Said minor child is not a lfparentless child11 
so as to give rise to a recognizable interest in the plain-
tiffs sufficient to permit intervention by plaintiffs in the 
adoption proceedings or to permit grandparent visitation 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV-89-1994 
This matter comes before the court, under Rule 4-
501, on the motion of defendant, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
URCP, seeking an order dismissing plaintiffs1 Complaint for 
Grandparent Visitation Rights. Plaintiffs were represented by 
Michael J. Petro, attorney at law, and defendants were 
represented by David M. McConkie, attorney at law. The court 
has reviewed the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of 
counsel, and upon being advised in the premises now finds the 
following: 
!• • • P 
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f. That plaintiffs wish to adopt said child or at 
least to exercise grandparent rights of visitation under the 
provisions of Section 30-5-2 UCA. 
g. That defendant insists that said adoptive place-
ment through LDS Social Services be confidential and anonymous. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes as 
follows: 
1. Said minor child is not a "parentless child" so 
as to give rise to a recognizable interest in the plaintiffs 
sufficient to permit intervention by plaintiffs in the adoption 
proceedings or to permit grandparent visitation rights. 
2. Plaintiffs1 complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this Z> day of *&B0., 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Culien Y. Christensen 
District Judge 
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David M. McConkie A2154 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUBY L. KASPER and DAVID 
KASPER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JENNIFER NORDFELT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV-89-1994 
This matter comes before the court, under Rule 4-
501, on the motion of defendant, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
URCP, seeking an order dismissing plaintiffs1 Complaint for 
Grandparent Visitation Rights. Plaintiffs were represented by 
Michael J. Petro, attorney at law, and defendants were 
represented by David M. McConkie, attorney at law. The court, 
having entered its Findings and Conclusions, hereby orders, 
adjudges and decrees that plaintiffs' Complaint for Grandparent 
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Visitation Riqhts be and the same hereby dismissed < */1 t h 
Jin e i ud ice • 
DATED t h i s </<-" day of Jfc£H^£l, 1.990. 
K f1; ron 
W_f£ (/-'- f^C4^C£^c^^/ 
Cullen Y. Christensen 
Dis ' tr i c t Ji ldge 
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I hereby certify that on this ^ day of -March, 
1990, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Michael J. Petro 
Young & Kester 
101 East 2 00 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
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"78-30-4 Consent to adop. - j ; . ab i l i ty claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority 
(3) (a) A person who is the lather or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in, question. 
CHAPTER 5 
GRANDPARENTS 
Section 
30-5-1. Definitions. 
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
30-5-1. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "District court" means the district court within whose jurisdiction 
the grandchildren reside; 
(2) "Grandparents" means: (a) grandparents whose child, who is the 
parent of the grandchildren, is dead, or, (b) grandparents whose child, 
who is the parent of the grandchildren, is divorced or legally separated 
from the other parent of the grandchildren; 
(3) "Grandchildren" means the child or children that a grandparent is 
seeking visitation rights with under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 30-5-1, enacted by L. nonpaxent child custody cases, 45 A L.R.4th 
1977, ch. 123, § 1; 1983, ch. 117, § 1. 212. 
A.L.R. — Attorneys' fee awards m parent-
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents . 
The district court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation to 
grandchildren, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren. 
History: C. 1953, 30-5-2, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Welfare of child con-
1977, ch. 123, § 2. sidered in granting visitation rights, § 30-3-5. 
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